INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the increasing interest in financial stability as an autonomous policy target, along with monetary and microeconomic stability, has encouraged the analyses of the linkages between the macroeconomic environment and the soundness of the banking system.
This stream of work is usually referred to as research on the "procyclicality" of banks' operations. Most of these studies use the current status of macroeconomic conditions as the main exogenous cause for the state of health of banks. The goal is to assess to what extent macroeconomy affects banks' performance (cyclicality) and whether, in turn, banks' reaction to changing macroeconomic conditions further affects the macroeconomy, reinforcing cyclical fluctuations (procyclicality). These studies generally confirm that banks' balance sheets are affected, simultaneously or with some delay, by the business cycle and claim that banks' behaviour is procyclical.
However, the change in banks' behaviour through the business cycle is not explicitly modelled, but it is simply inferred looking at the reduced-form relationships between micro and macro variables. Bank-specific indicators are frequently included as regressors, but they are only used as control variables, while the focus rests on the proxies for macroeconomic conditions. Furthermore, apart from some recent papers on North-American banks, no study assesses the role that macroeconomic uncertainty plays in determining banks' behaviour: in other words, no attention is paid on the second moments of macroeconomic variables.
Summing up, the current state of the art is unsatisfactory for two main reasons:
i) no attempt is made in order to model how banks' management varies in changing This paper tries to fill these gaps. In particular, it aims at disentangling which are the determinants of banks' willingness to invest in risky loans as opposed to riskfree assets and understanding whether macroeconomic uncertainty plays a role in this choice. Following the portfolio model proposed by Baum et al. (2005) , which provides an explicit link between the cross-bank dispersion of the share of loans held in portfolio and uncertainty, the paper discusses how Italian banks choose between loans and riskfree assets when the uncertainty of macroeconomic conditions increases. Given the substantial differences between North-American and European banking sectors, this paper can provide useful insights on the reliability of the model when a different sample of intermediaries is used.
An important innovation of this work is that, with respect to Baum et al., who neglect the role of idiosyncratic factors in the econometric specification, the impact of macroeconomic uncertainty is assessed after controlling for bank-specific sources of uncertainty. In particular, introducing an appropriate proxy, I explicitly consider the importance of idiosyncratic uncertainty in determining banks' portfolio decisions.
This paper also enriches the existing evidence employing different proxies for macroeconomic uncertainty; this also allows me to extensively assess the robustness of the results. Finally, the paper provides evidence on banks' sub-samples, testing whether the theory is valid at different levels of aggregation.
The econometric results confirm that macroeconomic uncertainty plays a significant role in Italian banks' investment decisions. In periods of increasing turmoil, The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 and 3 provide a short survey of the literature and describe the portfolio model used in the analysis.
Section 4 reports the empirical results. Conclusions are provided in Section 5.
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
There is a huge literature supporting the hypothesis that macroeconomic conditions affect the performance of the banking sector 1 . Most of the work focuses on measures of central tendency rather than on those of uncertainty. Salas and Saurina (2002) , for instance, observe that macroeconomic shocks are quickly transmitted to Spanish banks' balance sheets. During economic booms, intermediaries tend to expand their lending activity, often relaxing their selection criteria; in the following downturns, bad loans remarkably increase, producing losses.
Using a panel of Italian banks, Quagliariello (in press, b) finds that loan loss provisions and bad debts increase in bad macroeconomic times. Pesola (2001) shows that the high level of both corporate and households' indebtedness, along with shortfalls of GDP growth below forecast levels, contributed to the banking crises in the Nordic countries.
Similar evidence is provided in cross-country comparisons by Bikker and Hu (2002) 
BANKS' LENDING DECISIONS UNDER UNCERTAINTY: BAUM, CAGLAYAN AND OZKAN'S MODEL
Adapting the framework for non-financial firms' investments presented by Beaudry et al. (2001) , Baum et al. (2005) propose a model that describes how banks set the optimal composition of their portfolios.
In their scheme, banks' managers operate in a risky environment and, in each period, can invest deposits into two different assets: loans and bonds. The investment in bonds is assumed free of default risk, but it bears market risk since the value of the securities may change as a result of varying market conditions. This risk is predictable and, more importantly, it can be managed and hedged. The return of such an investment is the risk free rate (r f ).
Loans to customers entail the exposure to both market and default risk. The latter is the result of an idiosyncratic component -due the probability that the specific customer will default in the future without repaying the debt -and systemic factors, correlated to the status of the economy. In fact, it is well documented that in bad macroeconomic times the riskiness of bank portfolios tends to increase. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54 
The risk premium has an expected value E(rp i )=ρ and a variance Var(rp i )=σ 2 ε .
The return on loans can thus be expressed as:
where ε i is a random component distributed as N(0, σ 2 ε ). Baum et al. also assume that each bank has a specific portfolio with different riskiness structure and, hence, the random components of return across different intermediaries are not
Banks' managers deal with a portfolio optimization problem. They rebalance the composition of their assets in order to obtain the preferred combination of risk and expected return. According to their utility functions, they choose the shares α i and (1-α i ) of their assets to invest respectively in loans and bonds. However, before taking the decision, banks observe neither the actual risk premium nor the random component ε i , but only a noisy signal of them:
2 The subscript t is omitted since the model describes a one period problem. 
The conditional expected return of the i-th bank's portfolio E[R i |S i ] is therefore:
and the conditional variance Var[R i |S i ] is:
Risk-averse banks are assumed to have the following utility function:
which is increasing in expected return and decreasing in return volatility (and ω is the coefficient of risk aversion).
Employing the portfolio's mean/variance equations, it is straightforward to derive the optimal loan-to-asset ratio (α i ) for bank i and the associated cross-sectional dispersion:
The variance of the cross-sectional distribution of the loan-to-asset ratio is negatively correlated to the level of macroeconomic uncertainty σ 2 ν . Indeed, taking the first derivative of the variance of α i with respect to σ 2 ν , it derives: 
which provides a testable implication of the hypothesis that the cross-sectional variance of the loan-to-asset ratio narrows as macroeconomic uncertainty increases.
The variance of α i instead widens when the variance of the idiosyncratic component increases:
Therefore, it is essential to control for this component when testing for the impact of macroeconomic uncertainty. The choice of a proper proxy for idiosyncratic risk may however represent a major problem.
In sum, I have two hypotheses to test:
Hypothesis 1): When macroeconomic uncertainty increases, banks tend to allocate assets in their portfolios more homogeneously (the variance of α across banks reduces);

Hypothesis 2): When idiosyncratic uncertainty increases, banks tend to behave more heterogeneously (the variance of α across banks rises).
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Data
The impact of macroeconomic uncertainty on banks' lending decisions can be empirically tested using the following specification: 
where LTA i,t is the loan-to-asset ratio and Var t (LTA i,t ) is its cross-sectional variance at time t; σ 2 ν represents macroeconomic uncertainty evaluated at time t; σ 2 ε is the idiosyncratic uncertainty and u t is the error term.
The cross-bank variance of the LTA is built up using quarterly data (1990q1- Accounting ratios for the individual institutions are built up using the statistics that intermediaries are required to report to the Bank of Italy; the macroeconomic variables are drawn from the OECD main economic indicators (MEI) dataset.
The evolution of the loan-to-asset ratio over time is drawn in figure 1 . The ratio shows a clear ascending trend, witnessing the increasing liberalization of the Italian credit market and the competitive incentives to improve market positions that banks received during the '90s. Also, the gradual reduction of interest rates made the subscription of securities, especially government bonds, less profitable for banks.
[Insert figure 1 here]
Given the relevance of this trend, I estimate model (a) using the coefficient of variation rather than the variance of the LTA in order to have a unit-free measure of dispersion: Table 2 shows the main descriptive statistics for the loan-to-asset ratio (LTA), its variance (STDLTA) and coefficient of variation (CVLTA). Data refer to the whole banking system as well as to 5 dimensional breakdowns 4 .
[Insert table 2 here]
4 According to the classifications provided by the Bank of Italy, banks are grouped into five categories depending on the size of their total assets: major banks (total assets greater than 45 billion euros), large (total assets between 20 and 45 billion euros), medium-sized (7-20), small (1-7), minor (total assets up to 1 billion euros). Certainly, the evolution of LTA is also affected by the consolidation process of the Italian banking system. Indeed, after M&As, the newly established banking groups tended to reorganize their portfolios and, in some cases, to allocate specific assets to specialized entities of the group. This is particularly evident for major banks in 1995 and 1998.
Measuring macroeconomic uncertainty
There are several ways to measure macroeconomic uncertainty. According to Driver et al. (2004) and Sepulveda-Umanzor (2004) two approaches are dominant: the "survey based approach" (or cross-section dispersion forecasts) and the "model based approach" (or time series conditional volatility).
The first one exploits the surveys on the expectations on relevant macroeconomic variables and obtains a measure of uncertainty as the intra-personal dispersion of the expectations. A main shortcoming of this methodology is that the intra-personal dispersion (i.e., the true uncertainty) is not observable and may only be (Zarnowitz and Lambros, 1987; Bomberger, 1996) . In fact, it is possible that, even if each forecaster is extremely uncertain about future events, all of them submit similar estimates. Then, this measure would fail to capture the amount of existing uncertainty (Grier and Perry, 2000) .
The second metric is obtained employing the realised values of the macroeconomic variables in order to get statistical or econometric estimations of their variability. Even though many measures of uncertainty can be implemented from timeseries (unconditional variance, one-step ahead forecast errors, etc.), the conditional heteroskedasticity estimated with G(ARCH) models is one of the most widely used (Engle, 1982; Bollerslev, 1986) . In the case of GARCH(1,1), the conditional variance of a variable (h t ) can be estimated, along with its mean, using the following specification:
Provided that the coefficients on the ARCH and GARCH effects are statistically significant, the fitted values of h t can be employed as proxies for uncertainty. This approach has two potential drawbacks. First, as highlighted by Sepulveda-Umanzor (2004) , "rather than measuring uncertainty, the model based approach really measures volatility. The former is a feature that forward looking agents face when confronting any decision, the latter is a characteristic of the data once uncertainty has been solved".
Second, the time-series used in the analyses do not necessarily exhibit (G)ARCH processes. Given the complexity of defining reliable proxies for uncertainty, ideally one would use both the approaches recalled above. However, due to lack of data on survey outputs, in this paper I use the latter and calculate the conditional heteroskedasticity of relevant macroeconomic variables as proxies for macroeconomic uncertainty 5 . In spite of some of its shortcomings, this approach is commonly used in the literature. As a robustness check, I also use the one-step ahead forecast error as an alternative metric. As pointed out by Carruth et al. (2000) , often the literature that uses conditional variance as a measure of uncertainty assumes, rather than testing, both the stationarity of the time-series and the presence of (G)ARCH effects. In this paper, the original monthly series are transformed in order to obtain the monthly percentage rates of change of industrial production (INDPRODC), CPI (INFL) and the leading indicator (LEADINDC). The transformation allows to work with stationary series ( Enders (1995) , starting with 6 lags, a trend and a constant.
[Insert table 3 here]
The results of the Lagrange Multiplier tests for null hypothesis of no ARCH effects suggest that both industrial production growth and CPI inflation exhibit significant conditional heteroskedasticity; for the series of the composite leading indicator, the test is not significant instead (table 4) . Accordingly, I exclude the latter variable from the analysis and estimate the GARCH models only for the former two variables. Table 5a and 5b provide the results of the unrestricted GARCH(1,1) models performed on industrial production growth (INDPRODC) and inflation (INFL). In the variance equation, the coefficients of the ARCH and GARCH effects are significant respectively at the 5 and 1 per cent levels for both the variables.
[Insert table 4 here]
[Insert tables 5a, 5b here]
The conditional variance (h t ) derived from each GARCH model is finally averaged to quarterly frequency in order to obtain the measure of macroeconomic uncertainty The LM tests cannot reject the null hypothesis of no additional ARCH effects at any conventional level. These results confirm that the specification is able to capture all the conditional heteroskedasticity present in industrial production and inflation series and corroborate the choice of the parsimonious GARCH (1,1). The correct specification of the generating regressions should ensure parameter consistency also in the derived model (Pagan and Ullah, 1988) .
Figures 3 and 4 plot the coefficient of variation of the loan-to-asset ratio and the measures of industrial production and inflation uncertainty respectively.
[Insert figures 3, 4 here]
In the aftermath of the EMS crisis in the first half of the '90s, the coefficient of variation of the LTA ratio reaches the lowest figure. In the same period, macroeconomic -especially inflation -uncertainty rises markedly.
6 Strictly speaking this measure is not the quarterly volatility, but the average of the monthly volatilities in a given quarter. As an alternative measure I also use the quarter-end conditional variance. Results are unchanged. The dispersion of the LTA shows a significant increase during the second half of the decade, a period characterized by the vigorous process of consolidation, which encouraged banks to look for new markets and more profitable activities. This may help explain more heterogeneous behaviour across intermediaries. Both measures of economic uncertainty show a descending trend during the '90s; for inflation, this tendency is particularly noticeable at the end of those years. This is likely one of the benefits of the EMU convergence process.
Econometric specification and results
The final specification of model (b) is the following:
where h t is the estimated conditional variance of either industrial production growth (INDPRVA) or inflation (INFLVA). According to hypothesis 1), the expected sign of the coefficient of this regressor is negative. Along with the proxy for macroeconomic uncertainty (h t ), I also introduce some control variables.
First, I employ the 1-quarter lead of the cross-sectional variance of the nonperforming loan ratio (STDNPL). This indicator is a proxy for the idiosyncratic uncertainty. If at time t the idiosyncratic uncertainty (ε i ) increases allowing "good" banks to correctly predict the expected return/risk of different investments, in the following periods the riskiness of those banks should be significantly lower than that of poorly informed intermediaries. Therefore, the variance of the non-performing loans ratio across intermediaries should widen. Of course, the NPL ratio is also affected by systemic factors; however, its cross-sectional dispersion may still provide some useful Lastly, I introduce a variable (SHAREC) aiming at assessing the impact of the conditions on financial markets, since this is another factor that may influence banks'
decisions. This variable is the quarterly rate of change of the "all shares" index calculated by the OECD from daily closing quotations. Tables 6, 7 [Insert tables 6, 7, 8 here] In both the specification, the proxies for macroeconomic uncertainty show the expected negative sign and are statistically significant, although their economic relevance is different. In particular, the magnitude of the coefficient on INFLVA (-1.23) suggests that this variable is an important determinant of LTA dispersion.
Overall, this confirms that Italian banks behave more homogenously when the perspectives of the economy are unclear. This is consistent with the evidence regarding US and Canadian banks reported respectively by Baum et al. (2004) and Garcia and Calmes (2005) and with the results of Beaudry et al. (2001) for UK non-financial firms.
However, it is worth pointing out that, with aggregate data, no inference can be drawn on the allocation of funds to particular loans and hence the credit risk of the loan book. In other words, the model implicitly assumes that bank's loan portfolio is homogenous. These assumptions should be ideally tested providing results for several loan categories, along with the aggregate ones 7 . Unfortunately, due to data limitations, this is not feasible at this stage.
The proxy for idiosyncratic uncertainty is also statistically significant and takes on a positive sign. When the returns on specific investments are less easily predictable, better informed banks can exploit their competitive advantage and behave in a different way with respect to poorly informed intermediaries.
7 I am grateful to the referee for raising this point. In sum, results confirm that systemic uncertainty, both on the real and the financial side of the economy, induces intermediaries to herding behaviour. In contrast, individual uncertainty leads banks to behave more heterogeneously when deciding the allocation of their assets.
As far as the other control variables are concerned, industrial production growth is never significant. The inclusion of different variables aiming at controlling for the evolution of the business cycle, such as the leading indicator, demand and consumption growth or changes in the interest rates, does not change this evidence. This result indicates that the level of aggregate economic activity does not have any impact on the cross-sectional variability of the share that banks decide to invest in risky loans.
However, the significance of the control variables must be interpreted with caution since the proxy for uncertainty is a generated regressor and the coefficient on it is significantly different from zero (Pagan, 1984; Oxley and McAleer, 1993) .
The coefficient on inflation is not significant as well. The changes of the stock exchange index are slightly significant in the model with industrial production uncertainty.
Robustness checks
Size breakdowns
The dataset with banks' size breakdowns is used for robustness checks. The model is estimated using panel data techniques that exploit the cross-sectional dimension and allow obtaining more robust results 8 . For the estimation, I can exploit
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Macroeconomic uncertainty has a significant negative impact on the cross-bank dispersion of the loan-to-asset ratio, while the proxy for idiosyncratic uncertainty shows a positive sign. In these specifications, industrial production growth is significant, though at the 10 per cent level, and takes on a negative sign. According to this evidence, banks would take more uniform portfolio decisions during expansions. Inflation remains not significant, contrasting the idea that higher inflation levels are perceived as signals of economic turmoil. The Hausman tests for both the regressions imply that the random effects are appropriate for this sample.
Uncertainty based on the one-step ahead forecast error
In this paragraph, I use a different proxy for macroeconomic uncertainty in order to check whether my previous results are robust to different measures. The metric proposed here is based on the 1-step ahead forecast errors of the autoregressive models of industrial production growth and inflation. As suggested by Serven (1998) , to ensure that the predictions use no more information than that available at the time they are formulated, they are computed from recursive estimation of the autoregressions.
Therefore, for each variable, I estimate recursively the following auto-regressive model of order 2:
Unfortunately, this is not necessarily the case, since Italian banks are not specialized according to their size.
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[Insert table 11 here]
The role of uncertainty is confirmed by this exercise. Both additional proxies for macroeconomic uncertainty are statistically significant and negative. In particular, inflation unpredictability seems to be the most relevant determinant of banks' herding behaviours. Idiosyncratic uncertainty remains significantly positive.
CONCLUSIONS
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LOAN-TO-ASSET RATIO: SIZE BREAKDOWN
Major Banks
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